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ESTRATEGIAS PARA SUPERAR LA “BRECHA” ENTRE LA INVESTIGACIÓN Y LA PRÁCTICA EN LA PSICOLOGÍA DEL 
DEPORTE Y DEL EJERCICIO FÍSICO 
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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the continuing research-practice gap that exists within sport and exercise psychology. It explores the 
reasons why this gap exists, and, crucially, considers solutions to reduce the magnitude and impact of the gap between researchers and 
practitioners within the field. In this narrative review, we explore what the consequences might be for the future of the field of sport and 
exercise psychology if solutions are not developed that are advantageous to both arms of the profession. The paper concludes by 
exploring strategies for closing the research-practice gap, including a renewed emphasis on practical theories, and the development of 
theories of practice that are research-informed and practitioner-led. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sport psychology has an history of failing to address a 
notable and problematic ‘gap’ between research and practice 
(Hassmén, Keegan, and Piggott, 2016; Hutter, Oldenhof-
Veldman, Pijpers and Oudejans, 2016). Vealey (2006) 
summarised this issue, reflecting that: “Research is viewed as 
incomprehensible, pointless and boring, while practice is viewed 
as pseudoscientific and ineffective. [We should be] asking real 
world questions, with an eye on the person in context, aiming 
for practical theory… not theoretical practice” (p.148). In 
essence, the research-practice ‘gap’ reflects differences between 
what is researched, written about, and read - and thus accepted 
by most graduates – versus what is helpful when it comes to 
sitting down opposite an athlete seeking psychological support. 
The research-practice and practice-research ‘gaps’ are a 
common problem across all of science, and not unique to sport 
and exercise psychology (Norman, 2010).  This position paper 
seeks to propose broad strategies that can be used to mitigate and 
reduce the research-practice gap.  
 
What causes the ‘research-practice gap’?  
To fully understand the research-practice gap, we need to 
understand the different aims and activities of each side, and the 
different skill-sets required in both domains (Hassmén et al., 
2016). Both skill-sets can be quite advanced, requiring extensive 
training and practice, a fact that can underpin the issue: very few 
people have the time or inclination to accumulate both these very 
different skill-sets. These two hard-earned skill-sets, with 
different languages, aims and methods, can be difficult to 
reconcile (cf. Norman, 2010). Thus the researchers ‘get on with’ 
research, and the practitioners ‘get on with’ practice, solving 
different problems using different methods and approaches; 
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separately. In this way, a significant opportunity to advance both 
research and practice is lost (Norman 2010).  
Research usually prefers carefully manipulated conditions, 
forming abstract characterisations of the phenomena under 
consideration and studying them in a controlled research 
environment. Similarly, the theories within research are often 
simplified and abstracted to a pristine form – and this is argued 
to be necessary in order to facilitate their testing. In contrast, the 
real world of applied practice is complex and messy, because it 
takes place in real-life situations, with uncontrolled and poorly 
defined variables; often behaving in ways that contradict the 
neat/clean assumptions of research. In this way, researchers 
attempting to study applied practice may see a messy and 
complex world with no control and rigor. By contrast, 
practitioners attempting to engage with research may see a world 
of stale, abstract and irrelevant findings that would never survive 
contact with the complexities of the real world. Hence, there are 
two separate groups, with a notable ‘gap’ between them.  
 
What are the consequences of allowing a ‘research-practice 
gap’?  
A simple overview of negative consequences from a 
research-practice gap is as follows: (a) research is not used for 
its intended purpose – or at least its moral purpose – of informing 
practice and generating improved outcomes in the real world; 
and (b) practice is not sufficiently ‘evidence-based’, sometimes 
to the extent that people start redefining ‘evidence’ very loosely, 
that is as their own opinions and applied experiences – which is 
not how evidence-based-practice is intended to be used 
(Chambless, 1999; Chambless and Ollendick, 2001; Gardner 
and Moore, 2005). There are additional concerns, however; for 
example, perceiving a disconnection between ‘scientific’ 
research and applied practice can undermine the professional 
image of the field, and thereby the confidence of those seeking 
sport psychological support.  
The research-practice gap also makes it much more difficult 
to train future practitioners, as there is no consistent vocabulary, 
no strong models of practice, and thus no way of understanding 
what practitioners do, or why (Keegan, 2010; 2014; 2016a; b). 
This gap can reduce training in applied practice to an ‘art’ or 
‘craft’; wherein important rules and principles are not 
understood or conveyed (Jones, 2008). This lack of concepts and 
theories detailing the processes of applied practice can lead 
practitioners to make vital decisions about philosophy or 
delivery-style quite arbitrarily, as opposed to this being a 
carefully reasoned and transparent decision (see also Martindale 
and Collins, 2010; 2012; Poczwardowski, Aoyagi, Shapiro, and 
Van Raalte, 2014; Poczwardowski and Sherman, 2011).  
Researchers are judged on the number of papers they 
produce, the popularity of the journals they publish in, and the 
number of times other researchers ‘cite’ their work. These core 
values can then be combined into measures of impact such as the 
H-index. These measures are frequently referred to by review 
committees and grant funding panels when reviewing 
academics, but not practitioners. Hence, researchers have to 
create work that has a very good chance of being cited. At 
present, applied practitioners rarely write journal articles – so 
there is virtually no chance of being cited by applied 
practitioners (Hassmén et al., 2016). Hence, there is little real-
world incentive for academics to do work of relevance to applied 
practitioners (Hassmén et al., 2016; Norman, 2010). Instead, 
researchers are incentivised to produce papers chiefly for other 
researchers that – for the main part – extend and propagate the 
same assumptions, theories, methods and measurement 
instruments that other researchers resort to. As a beginning on 
the journey to closing the research-practice gap, and reducing or 
avoiding the problems outlined in this section, the following 
passages will explore two broad ‘strategies’: practical theories; 
and theories-of-practice. First, however, theoretical practice – 
maligned by Martens (1979) and Vealey (2006) – must be 
explained. 
 
What has been the problem? Theoretical practice 
In a world where theories and paradigms dominate how 
research is done (cf. Kuhn, 1970; Popper, 1959; 2002), and 
ethical frameworks (rightly) prescribe that practitioners should 
base their applied work on the literature that this generates, 
theory-driven practice is the result (Martens, 1987; Vealey, 
2006). In some ways, given that we rarely attempt to test our 
theories to destruction, or seek to ‘gold standard’ evidence that 
a theory really does withstand scrutiny, theory-driven practice is 
a fair description of the outcome (cf. Gardner and Moore, 2005; 
Hassmén et al., 2016). A theory – good or bad, and with key 
claims often untested – can be used to tell a practitioner what to 
do with their clients (Jones and Mehr, 2007; Wilson, 
Armoutliev, Yakunina, and Werth, 2009). This can, at times, 
force a practitioner to simplify an athlete’s uniquely personal 
and complex needs into a highly simplistic theory. And much of 
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the research in sport and exercise psychology is, quite famously, 
either based in labs away from actual performance settings (cf. 
Martens 1979, 1987), or based on cross sectional survey data and 
correlational analysis (cf. Keegan, 2016; Vealey, 2006), and as 
such provides insufficient evidence to know whether a theory is 
‘true’. Effectively forcing practitioners to use highly simplified 
(parsimonious) theories - developed in carefully controlled 
research settings that were not reflective to the real-world setting 
of applied practice – results in ‘theoretical practice’.  
 
Practical theories and theories-of-practice 
Picking up on his critique of the way he believed sport 
psychology was evolving, Martens (1979) specified that we 
should seek practical theories, not theoretical practice. This 
might be equated to the idea that “there is nothing more practical 
than a good theory” (Lewin; 1952, p.169). Many philosophers-
of-science (e.g., Popper, Lakatos, etc.), as well as many well-
known scientists (e.g., Hawking, Einstein) have argued that 
theories should be developed to help solve practical, real-world 
problems.  
 
Practical theories 
Many authors have argued that theories, themselves, are not 
particularly important, but rather they are merely tools to assist 
in the solving of important problems (Hassmén et al., 2016; 
Popper, 1959; 2002). Martens (1979; 1987) was arguing that, in 
his view, theories had become the dominant driving force in 
sport psychology; that we had become a profession driven by 
our tools and gadgets as opposed to providing efficient solutions 
to meaningful problems. Martens (and many others since) 
argued that the theories driving sport psychology research were 
not ‘fit-for-purpose’ when it comes to applied practice. At this 
point, it is important to clarify exactly what a theory is, or should 
be. A popular and well-argued explanation was given by 
Hawking (1988; p.11 – italics and parentheses added): “A theory 
is a good theory if it satisfies two requirements: [1] It must 
accurately describe a large class of observations… and [2] it 
must make definite predictions about the result of future 
observations”. Occasionally there is an argument that, ideally, 
theories should be as simple as practically possible – although 
this should be viewed as a heuristic guide and not a hard rule 
(Baker, 2003, 2013; Courtney and Courtney, 2008; Sober, 1990, 
1996). This latter idea of simplicity might be useful when 
considering that many existing and popular theories tend to 
‘sprout’ additional qualifiers and ‘get-out clauses’ when faced 
with problematic observations – the so-called Duhem-Quine 
principle (Lakatos, 1970). As a final criterion, if a theory is to be 
discussed and evaluated by scientists, it must be communicable 
such that someone other than the ‘holder’ can understand it too. 
It seems relatively straightforward, and yet Martens and many 
since have argued that the theories of sport and exercise 
psychology often fail these basic tests, making them not fit-for-
purpose and thus instead contributing to the research-practice 
gap.  
It is perfectly possible for practitioners to generate, evaluate 
and refine theories, using this definition. And yet, so long as the 
literature is dominated by researchers – solving different 
problems and using different techniques and assumptions - 
practitioners will remain passive recipients or ‘consumers’, 
receiving whatever theories and evidence researchers offer 
them. It is difficult to imagine the mechanism through which a 
practitioner could take a new theory ‘to market’, for others to 
view, evaluate and perhaps adopt. In fact as well as being 
difficult it may not be particularly rewarding for the practitioner: 
offering one’s best ideas to others might be seen as 
entrepreneurial suicide. Hence, there is no mechanism, nor any 
incentive, to attract the ideas, feedback, or creative contributions 
of applied practitioners in sport and exercise psychology. 
Perhaps, for example, being seen to work publicly with 
researchers, and praised by editors or journals on social media 
might constitute excellent promotion and additional credibility 
for practitioners.  
As well as encouraging practitioners to publish and cite, the 
key gatekeepers of the literature can also play a key role. For 
example, when editors receive papers claiming to explain 
fractionally more variance in some subjectively rated concept 
that seems several steps removed from real-life, we might 
consider discouraging people from doing that research; and 
instead encouraging them to work alongside practitioners in 
delivering relevant and practical research. We should be asking 
practitioners what types of theories we need to build, and what 
problems they perceive in existing ones – and then using that 
information both in the commissioning of research and in its 
evaluation. The first priority of ‘practical theories’ should be to 
support real-world athletes, coaches, practitioners, parents and 
governing bodies. Morally speaking, at least, one of the lowest 
priorities should be advancing researchers’ citations and impact 
factors.  
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Theories of practice.  
One approach that was not explicitly put forward in 
Martens’ dichotomy of ‘theoretical practice’ versus ‘practical 
theory’ is the option for research to examine the ‘art’ of applied 
practice. Like any phenomenon, the processes of applied 
practice can be studied, described, modelled (or theorised) and 
evaluated. Recent work by Poczwardowski et al. (2014) and 
Keegan (2016) has started to describe the processes followed by 
practitioners. Keegan’s model specifically suggests linkages 
between key processes followed by practitioners, and testable 
predictions. For example, the model could be used to predict that 
the quality of the needs analysis will contribute significantly to 
the quality of the outcomes; or practitioners who maintain a 
consistent philosophical approach with each individual client 
will likely produce improved client experiences and outcomes. 
Notwithstanding these very recent developments, sport and 
exercise psychology currently generates relatively little research 
examining the processes and mechanisms of applied practice.  
There is a strong tendency in sport and exercise psychology 
– and many fields – to cast applied practice as an art or craft: 
mythical and magical processes not suitable for the scrutiny of 
researchers (Hassmén et al., 2016; Keegan, 2016). On one hand, 
this is understandable given the profound differences in 
assumptions and methods between researchers versus 
practitioners. On the other hand, such a shroud of mysticism 
undermines the credibility and transparency of any discipline it 
affects.  The benefits of researching applied practice are 
relatively clear: (1) we would understand the processes of 
applied practice better; (2) we could therefore give our applied 
practitioners increased ability to deliver positive outcomes (and 
avoid negative outcomes) when they work with clients; (3) the 
very theories and research generated by researchers would be 
used by practitioners in the real world, not simply remaining in 
journals where they may or may not be picked up by other 
researchers: actual ‘impact’; (4) we could improve the training 
of applied practitioners (5) we could improve the accountability 
and transparency of applied practitioners, and facilitate informed 
and meaningful reviews of practice and case-studies; and thus 
(6) ultimately, we could increase the credibility of the field of 
sport and exercise psychology. Overall, therefore, there is 
incredible value yet to be realised in proactively researching the 
processes, assumptions and mechanisms of applied practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTRATEGIAS PARA SUPERAR LA “BRECHA” ENTRE LA INVESTIGACIÓN Y LA PRÁCTICA EN LA PSICOLOGÍA DEL 
DEPORTE Y DEL EJERCICIO FÍSICO 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Investigación aplicada, práctica basada en la evidencia, becas, práctica profesional. 
RESUMEN: Este artículo explora la persistente brecha entre investigación y la práctica profesional de la psicología del ejercicio y 
deporte. Este artículo explora las razones por las que existe esta brecha y, fundamentalmente, considera soluciones para reducir la 
magnitud y el impacto de la brecha entre investigadores y profesionales en el campo. En esta revisión narrativa, exploramos cuáles 
podrían ser las consecuencias para el futuro del campo del deporte y la psicología del ejercicio si no se desarrollan soluciones que sean 
ventajosas para ambos componentes de la profesión. El documento concluye explorando estrategias para cerrar la brecha investigación-
práctica, con el énfasis en las teorías prácticas, y el desarrollo de teorías de la práctica que son investigador-informado y dirigido por el 
practicante. 
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